ARIZONA REGULATOR

Some of the most important sections of the Landmark U.S Supreme Court decision are excerpted below.

We all owe GOA  Gun Owners of America a debt of gratitude for fighting the good fight and prevailing in this monumentous case.

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These sections confirm the ARIZONA REGULATOR ® is a Federal Legal Semi-Auto item.

It is all about how the ARIZONA REGULATOR ® Forced Reset Trigger Device Functions within Federal Law.

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Full doc is well worth the read.

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JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

“an accessory for a semiautomatic rifle that allows the shooter to rapidly reengage the trigger (and therefore achieve a high rate of fire)— converts the rifle into a “machinegun.”  We hold that it does not and therefore affirm.”

@  pg 1

“As always, we start with the statutory text, which refers to “a single function of the trigger.” . . . ; Webster’s New International Dictionary 2711 (2d ed. 1934) (“A piece, as a lever, connected with a catch or detent as a means of releasing it; specif., Firearms, the part of a lock moved by the finger to release the cock in firing”).  The phrase “function of the trigger” thus refers to the mode of action by which the trigger activates the firing mechanism.  For most firearms, including the ones at issue here, the trigger is a curved metal lever.  On weapons with these standard trigger mechanisms, the phrase “function of the trigger” means the physical trigger movement required to shoot the firearm.”

@  pg 7

“is not a machinegun because it fires only one shot per “function of the trigger.”. . . .  To understand why, it is helpful to consider the mechanics of the firing cycle for a semiautomatic rifle. Because the statutory definition is keyed to a “function of the trigger,” only the trigger assembly is relevant for our purposes. . . . When the shooter engages the trigger by moving it backward (as indicated by the arrow), the square point of the trigger pivots downward and out of the notch securing the hammer. Ibid.  This movement releases the spring-loaded hammer, allowing it to swing forward. Ibid.  At the top of the hammer’s rotation, it strikes the firing pin, causing the weapon to fire a single shot. See ibid.”

@  pg 7-8-9

“The trigger mechanism is thereby reset to the original position shown in Figure 1.  A semiautomatic rifle must complete this cycle for each shot fired. ATF does not dispute that this complete process is what constitutes a “single function of the trigger.”  A shooter may fire the weapon again after the trigger has reset, but only by engaging the trigger a second time and thereby initiating a new firing cycle. . . . “Any additional shot fired after one cycle is the result of a separate and distinct “function of the trigger.”“

@  pg 11 - 12

“merely reduces the amount of time that elapses between separate “functions” of the trigger.” . . . “makes it easier for the shooter to” . . . “thereby release pressure from the trigger and reset it.”

@  pg 12

“This argument rests on the mistaken premise that there is a difference between a shooter flexing his finger to pull the trigger and a shooter pushing the firearm forward to bump the trigger against his stationary finger.  ATF and the dissent seek to call the shooter’s initial trigger pull a “function of the trigger” while ignoring the subsequent “bumps” of the shooter’s finger against the trigger before every additional shot. But, §5845(b) does not define a machinegun based on what type of human input engages the trigger—whether it be a pull, bump, or something else. Nor does it define a machinegun based on whether the shooter has assistance engaging the trigger.  The statutory definition instead hinges on how many shots discharge when the shooter engages the trigger.  And, as we have explained, a semiautomatic rifle will fire only one shot each time the shooter engages the trigger . . . ”

@  pg 13

“But, Congress did not write a statutory definition of “machinegun” keyed to when a firing sequence begins and ends.  Section 5845(b) asks only whether a weapon fires more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger.” “

@  pg 14

“ Section 5845(b) asks whether a weapon “shoots . . . automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger.”  The statute thus specifies the precise action that must “automatically” cause a weapon to fire “more than one shot”—a “single function of the trigger.”  If something more than a “single function of the trigger” is required to fire multiple shots, the weapon does not satisfy the statutory definition.”

@  pg 14 – 15

“But, even if one aspect of a weapon’s operation could be seen as “automatic,” that would not mean the weapon “shoots . . . automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger.” §5845(b) (emphasis added).  After all, many weapons have some “automatic” features. For example, semiautomatic rifles eject the spent cartridge from the firearm’s chamber and load a new one in its place without any input from the shooter.  See supra, at 10.  A semiautomatic rifle is therefore “automatic” in the general sense that it performs some operations that would otherwise need to be completed by hand.  But, as all agree, a semiautomatic rifle cannot fire more than one shot “automatically . . . by a single function of the trigger” because the shooter must do more than simply engage the trigger one time. . . .  Thus, even if a semiautomatic rifle could fire more than one shot by a single function of the trigger, it would not do so “automatically.”“

@  pg 17

“In any event, Congress could have linked the definition of “machinegun” to a weapon’s rate of fire, as the dissent would prefer.  But, it instead enacted a statute that turns on whether a weapon can fire more than one shot “automatically . . . by a single function of the trigger.” §5845(b).  And, “it is never our job to rewrite . . . statutory text under the banner of speculation about what Congress might have done.”  Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017). 9 III 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  It is so ordered.”

@  pg 19